Similarly, in one of the comments, Fein expressed impatience with dialogue and speculation about “what might yet be in some distant future.” He wrote:

. For better or for worse, the situation is what it is. There is no significant disposition on either side to recognize the national claims of the other within a unitary state, and the consociational model has about as much relevance, given the bloody history of the relationship, as does my bathtub.

For a fascinating and quite brilliant exposition of the Belgian case and an explicit comparison of Belgium to Israel/Palestine, see the essay by Robert Mnookin in the 2007 issue of Deadelus. Mnookin’s conclusion?

“A single state solution–with some sort of consociational federal, or confederal, regime–does not provide a model for a stable long-term solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even assuming (as I do not) that it would somehow be acceptable to the parties.

“In circumstances where there has been a protracted history of ethnic violence between two peoples of roughly equal population, where their economic circumstances are profoundly different, where there are deep internal divisions within each community, and where there is no cadre of experienced leaders with constituents willing to accept collaborative problem solving, such a regime is unlikely to provide an arrangement for an enduring peace.”

That is why most of the world, including most people in the Balkans, thought that the only way to bring peace to that region in the 1990s was to divide it into what are essentially ethnic states. Restoring them into one polity and returning to the days of artificial Yugoslavian unity (which was made possible only by totalitarian dictat, under Tito) would have meant endless bloodshed and strife and torment. I am afraid the same thing applies to the current situation of Israelis and Palestinians in what was once Mandatory Palestine.

I have yet to hear any advocates of a unitary, bi-national state provide a good answer to the objections noted above. Even if you think it is the right thing to do, it is an impractical and dangerous thing to try to do. So, as I’ve written repeatedly, you are not doing Palestinians any favors by advocating it.

Topics: Palestinians, Israel, Zionism, American Jews, Far left |

103 Responses to “More conversations about one state vs. two states”

1. Lawrence Boxall Says:
   May 1st, 2007 at 3:28 pm

   One state solution not abortive and dangerous illusions - Answer to Uri Avnery

   By: Ilan Pappe

   An importatant contribution to this debate can be found at the link below. Avnery and Pappe will be debating each other in Tel Aviv on May 8th.

   http://www.hagada.org.il/eng/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=169

2. John S. Says:
   May 1st, 2007 at 4:08 pm

   ”All right, let’s say you believe everything about Israel is worthy of contempt and insult, and the Jews should never had set foot in Palestine, and the whole Zionist enterprise must be halted.”

   For the record, though a passionate one-state supporter, this is not my position at all. In fact, quite the opposite is true; I believe that the basis of the one-state should be the existing Israeli state sans the ethnocentric and exclusivist elements. If one looks at the existing Israeli civilian state (ignoring the 1945 Emergency Regulations that should go and are almost exclusively used against Israeli Arabs – currently MK Bishara) there is a solid liberal democracy for the most part (the religious domination of personal status law isn’t ideal, but I suspect that most Palestinians would agree to maintain this notion as well) and thus a solid existing state. It simply has to be purged of its ethnocentric and exclusivist elements; just as in South Africa Apartheid was repealed not by ending the existing state, but by a direct repeal of racist legislation (see Section 243 and Schedule 7 of the 1996 Constitution: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/sf20000_.html

   In my scheme I do not call for the destruction of Israel at all, just the removal of the ethnocentric and exclusivist ideological basis of the state in favor of an ethnicity-neutral and all inclusive state.

   ”Short of throwing out millions of Israeli Jews by force (which, of course, is an option that has its adherents on the blogosphere),”

   Ethnic cleansing isn’t an option for either side. The Palestinians simply do not have physical option even if they had the desire to do so [For the record, they do not: see the regular JMCC polls of Palestinian public opinion regarding the desirable outcome: http://www.jmcc.org/ both a Palestinian-Only state and a Islamic state only have single digit support; the two-state and bi-national options being the top two options.]. On the Israeli side, despite the respectability of “transfer” rhetoric epitomized by the welcoming of Avigdor Lieberman into the Kadima government, it really isn’t an option either. I have an article under peer review right now exploring this topic in some detail and if published will refer you to it.

   ” One comment I made to John S, however, is worth repeating: … “

   I think it is cute that you opted to highlight this comment of yours to me – including the factually incorrect notion that the one-state notion is a fringe element largely confined to academia on the Palestinian side of the equation – without also including my response. Of course it is your blog but such moves don’t exactly promote the image of balanced debate… .

   ”That is why most of the world, including most people in the Balkans, thought that the only way to bring peace to that region in the 1990s was to redivide it into what are essentially ethnic states. Restoring them into one polity and returning to the days of artificial Yugoslavian unity (which was made possible only by totalitarian dictat, under Tito) would have meant endless bloodshed and strife and torment. I am afraid the same thing applies to the current situation of Jews and Palestinians in what was once Mandatory Palestine.”

   However, what is being ignored in this argument is that the only reason these ethnic micro-states are viable is through membership in the European Union, which of course also limits their sovereignty as well. None of the European post-Cold War successor states – with the possible exceptions of the Czech Republic and Serbia Proper – would be viable as independent states for longer than a few years as stand alone entities outside of a supra-national framework like the European Union. Notice how poorly the post-Soviet ethnic micro-states in the Caucasus have faired without the support of a multi-national superstructure like the EU [the Armenia-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh; the domination of Turkic Fascists (Grey Wolves) in Azerbaijan, the Ossetian and Abkazian separatist movements tearing Georgia apart, and so on…].

   Anyway, I believe Israel could function as a stand alone state without the OPTs, however, there is virtually no chance of a viable functioning Palestinian state being created in the OPTs. Just as importantly, all existing “two-state” proposals are for a Palestinian Bantustan that remains under total Israeli domination (though with its own pseudo-autonomous Arab administration) and the only possible outcome of any sort of Bantustan scheme will be on par with post-Disengagement Gaza. If you believe that the two-state position is more realistic, you have to predicate that notion on a truly free and functioning Palestinian state (slight “adjustments” to the Occupation like Gaza won’t work) and this is not even on the agenda at this point.

   Even the most “liberal” ethno-separatist schemes – the Geneva Initiative & the Rand Proposals – deny a viable free Palestinian state, so let’s be honest – when you’re advocating a “two-state solution” what you’re actually advocating is a somewhat more humane (and easier for Israel to maintain) version of perpetual occupation and Israeli domination. No one on the Israeli side has seriously proposed – or barely even discussed – real Palestinian freedom, because that whole concept is incompatible with Israeli security. To date I haven’t seen a single “two-state” proposal that really calls for the creation of two-states, just a modification of the occupation to make it easier for Israel to maintain perpetually. The default is the existing status quo – as it is right now – the existing unitary state sans its racist elements.

3. Teddy Says:
   May 1st, 2007 at 4:13 pm

   Well-done, Dan. I did try to wade into the conversation between Richard ansd John S. It required a lot of patience. That’s one of the problems with this whole issue: it is so complicated that only people willing to read a lot and think very hard and learn about the two, very different “narratives” can have a clue about what their ideological adversaries are saying. Dumbing one’s position down into a few slogans –e.g., ‘The Jews stole the land” or “The Arabs still want to push Israelis into the sea” just adds more clutter and noise.

4. Richard Witty Says:
   May 1st, 2007 at 4:35 pm

   Ilan Pappe’s responses are the oppossite of what it would take to avoid cruelty to all concerned.

   The one-state solution itself could be constructed to meet multiple needs. Some of the attractions of the one-state solution include freedom to travel throughout the land and prospectively the region, equal and clear law applying equally throughout the land applying modern civil law rather than a juxtaposition of two diverging legal systems, rights for Jews to purchase land and reside in the West Bank and for Arabs to purchase land and reside in now Israel.

   Lots of appealing and relieving prospects.

   The problem that I hear is in how to get there.

   Ali Abunimah offered many examples of sincere acceptance of Jewish people and life, appreciation of Jews’ experience in enduring the holocaust and aftermath, some criticism of left and Arab ideological habits and fixations.

   BUT, and it is a big but, the model sought to get there is the one of agitation, as Ilan Pappe alluded.

   South Africa, and the imagined success of solidarity boycotts and violent resistance, repeated to force Israelis to their “senses”.

   What is new?

5. Tom Mitchell Says:
   May 1st, 2007 at 8:07 pm

   Since I’ve already been quoted above I feel I can join the conversation. After watching Prof. Abunimah on CSPAN talk about a one-state solution for the conflict I emailed him and offered to do a piece for his website on the experience of power sharing solutions in native-settler conflicts. After I wrote a piece about the experiences in Northern Ireland, Rhodesia and South Africa. I concluded that a one-state solution would be a dramatic failure. He wanted me to redo it so that I would indicate under what conditions it would be possible. So I rewrote it indicating that it would be possible only when partition was impossible and the dominant settler culture was forced to surrender to the native culture out of fear of eventually losing a liberation struggle. To my knowledge the piece was never posted by Abunimah on his website. This is despite my writing from a perspective that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a native-settler conflict–hardly an orthodox pro-Israeli perspective.

   Foreign Affairs magazine in their latest issue had an article on Iraq in which the author discussed why power sharing rarely works in ethnic conflicts. In essence it is similar to why two nuclear rivals without a second-strike capacity create such a dangerous situation: neither side trusts the other and both have an incentive for cheating. My experience has been that power sharing through consociational democracy tends to freeze the state of ethnic relations when it is implemented. The disempowered trades the promise of a possible improvement of ethnic relations and integration for immediate material and employment gains. Such gains are resented by the majority particularly if they are deemed to be unfair. Look at the attitude of most whites towards continued affirmative action. This is despite the fact that whites and blacks haven’t spent decades killing one another. If Northern Ireland’s latest experiment in power sharing works at all it will be the first time that power sharing has really worked in a violent ethnic conflict. Power sharing has already failed there twice before–in 1974 and in 2002. The first time it lasted about five months and failed due to Protestant working class backlash, IRA hostility and British gov’t indifference. In 2002 it failed due to the refusal of the IRA to disarm within the two-year period called for in the agreement and continued paramilitary and criminal activity by the IRA along with spying by its political wing, Sinn Fein. This led to the collapse of the moderate unionist (pro-Br Protestant) party and of the moderate nationalist (Irish Catholic) party. Now the two extremes are in power. The IRA has finally disarmed and declared the war to be over. This has allowed the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to share power with Sinn Fein starting a week from today. If it succeeds it will be more a testimony to the effectiveness of the form of mediation used and the dedication of the Br and Irish prime ministers. Part of the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998 was the Republic of Ireland changing its constitution to end its legal claim over Northern Ireland’s territory. Thus the Republicans were recognizing a two-state solution almost 80 years after one came into effect. Israel may want to implement consociational measures to improve interethmic relations within Israel between Arabs and Jews. But this will be in addition to a two-state solution, not as a substitute for it.

6. Dan Fleshler Says:
   May 1st, 2007 at 9:41 pm

   Tom,

   Welcome, Tom. I’m honored.

   You wrote:

   “It would be possible only when partition was impossible and the dominant settler culture was forced to surrender to the native culture out of fear of eventually losing a liberation struggle.”

   Is that how you would describe what happened in South Africa? If so, couldn’t this analysis be employed to justify a continuous “liberation struggle” that will evnetually force Israelis to relent? I obviously hope that does not happen, but it seems like a logic that rejectionists could use.

7. Richard Witty Says:
   May 2nd, 2007 at 4:22 am

   Jewish community is a jewel.

   If Jewish community can be confidently preserved within a federal or one-state solution, then it is practical and even desirable.

   If it cannot to a very high level of confidence, then it is impractical and undesirable.

   I’m not married to the idea that Jewish state is permanent and necessary. I am committed to the idea that Jewish community is permanent and necessary, and that an environment in which Jewish community is safe, vibrant, respectfully and respectedly interacting.

   The question of which is the more practical path to preserve Jewish community, including its need to be a kind neighbor, is a relevant one.

   The question framed as ideology vs confident survival and health, is a bad one.

   The leftist construct of urging appropriate accountability for behavior, for policies, designed to be most effective to change them in a humane way, is relevant.

   The leftist construct of urging punitive measures, designed to be indifferent to the effect on the community, is irrelevant.

   It looks more like the oppressive punitive features of boycotts on post-GulfWar1 Iraq, than something humane and liberatory.

   It confuses me that a proposal for intimacy would ONLY be framed in the language and strategy of resistance, rather than the more practical language and strategy of reconciliation and mutual respect.

   Historically, Jews have been repeatedly asked to grovel, and there is an element of that in the way the proposal is framed.

   Also, the issue of the right of return of Palestinians to a single state is a very difficult one. It would shift the status from one of roughly equal population, to one of gross Palestinian majority.

   As the poorer refugees comprise the largest number of those prospectively offered the right of return, the anger and resentment of that community is more likely to prevail than the civil and urbane sensitivities of the wealthier elite Palestinian diaspora in US, Canada and Europe, as Abunimah suggested would be the case.

   The features of equality are better urged within Israel and within Palestine.

   (While its hard to trust the arguments of some of the Hebron settlers, they did recently describe in a Haaretz article that in Palestine, and Jordan for that matter, individuals have been imprisoned and in some “revolutionary” cases executed, for selling land or homes to Jews. For the two-state solution to be just, both states would have to have law that resembles equal due process for all.)

8. Richard Witty Says:
   May 2nd, 2007 at 4:41 am

   A two-state solution, with boundaries and access defined to be “enough” rather than dominating over.

   Civil law with due process for all, with only very moderate preferences that preserve the nature of haven (both in Israel and in Palestine).

   Compensation or other mutually acceptable means of addressing all title claims of displaced Palestinians, and fewer displaced Jews formerly from the West Bank.

   A path for those with imperfect or ambiguous title to perfect that title, rather than forced dispossession (applies to Palestinians in now Israel, and to Jewish settlers in now Palestine).

   Driven by “do the right thing” rather than the nature of an exchange. (As in Abunimah’s acceptance of settlers’ residence in the West Bank, by compensation perfecting title, but only in a single state. Why not also in a two-state solution?)

   Why not start doing the right thing now, regardless of future bargaining position? (Israel removing checkpoints, not intentionally expanding expropriative settlements, removing military from the West Bank in a coordinated orderly manner, Israel restoring the right of residence to inter-married, etc.) (And Palestine establishing equal due process.)

   In some respect the Avnery article emphasized that the one-state solution would be bad for Palestinians as rather than being self-governed in a smaller geographical region, in a one-state solution (absent right of Palestinian return), they would likely be subordinated politically and economically, thereby critically losing in respects by the solution.

   And, one flip side to Abunimah’s implications, are that in a Palestinian separate state, he seems (my inference) to conclude that the Palestinians would not establish a regime of “due process for all” even to the level of current Israeli law (which is quite high in many areas, with a long way to go), that ONLY in a single state would rights be satisfactorily afforded to Jews.

   But, in ways that adds up to a demand supported by a threat. (Another peace of the brave after another decade of intifada/suppression/distrustful compromise?)

9. Tom Mitchell Says:
   May 2nd, 2007 at 6:11 pm

   Dan,
   Actually in South Africa the armed struggle was largely ineffective except to promote the political support of the ANC among blacks through “armed grafitti.” It was the fear of what a prolonged struggle lasting decades would due to South Africa’s eonomic position based on the experiences of Rhodesia and Namibia, that led De Klerk and his supporters to negotiate with the ANC from a position of strength, rather than waiting until they were nearly defeated as Smith did in Rhodesia. This allowed the National Party a place in the first majority rule cabinet and the retention of a capitalist economic system. Most whites have benefitted from the settlement, although a very high crime rate is a serious problem.

   Most Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah-Al Aksa Bdes. members already make this argument although they use Lebanon and Gaza as examples rather than South Africa. But in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, partition is quite possible based on modified 1967 border with territorial swaps. In Southern Africa partition wasn’t really viable because the whites were numerically a minority in all areas of any size. This is why limited power sharing was possible in South Africa. But because the Afrikaner negotiators from the National Party weren’t really conversant with consociational and federal theory and case studies, they did a much worse job of negotiating than the opposition Democratic Party probably could have done.

10. Dan F Says:
    May 2nd, 2007 at 6:15 pm

    Help! John S. seemed to think that I had deliberately blocked his comment (above) and said so on the following, annoyed post on “Internet Activist:”

    http://iablog.blogspot.com/2007/05/dan-fleshlers-realistic-dove-zionist.html

    As I explained to him via email, his comment (3 versions) was caught in the mysterious “Akismet” spam blocker that Word Press uses and I did not discover that until a few minutes ago.

    Sorry John S. Don’t give up on this conversation, please.

11. Richard Witty Says:
    May 2nd, 2007 at 9:12 pm

    Is a single-state solution desirable, if possible?

    Is a single-state solution possible?

12. John S. Says:
    May 3rd, 2007 at 12:05 am

    Hi Dan,

    I replied to your email and explained what apparently happened over on the IA blog, so assuming this is acceptable, I’ll hop back in.

    John S.

13. Dan Fleshler Says:
    May 3rd, 2007 at 7:35 am

    John S:

    You wrote:

    “No one on the Israeli side has seriously proposed – or barely even discussed – real Palestinian freedom, because that whole concept is incompatible with Israeli security.”

    Israeli security need not be incompatible with Palestinian “freedom.” It is incompatible with the unchecked freedom to send suicide bombers into restaurants and markets.

    “To date I haven’t seen a single “two-state” proposal that really calls for the creation of two-states, just a modification of the occupation to make it easier for Israel to maintain perpetually.”

    You’re right (I think, although there may have been more sweeping, end-game proposals that neither of us are aware of.) But I think you are neglecting that there was an attempt to implement a process of trust-building at the outset of the Oslo process. There were no fixed, declared goals for the final settlement because the Israeli negotiators wanted to give the Palestinian Authority a chance to prove to the Israeli public that they could establish and run a polity that could live side by side with Israel and that security responsibilities could be shared. That might seem arrogant now, but given the legacy of the PLO at the time, both sides understood it was essential. It was also essential for Israel to prove to the Palestinians that they were serious about relinquishing territory.

    So, it didn’t work. Both sides are too blame. I am as frustrated as you are that no Israeli government stood up to the settlers except in isolated cases. And Israel’s political system was too dysfunctional –or its leaders were too gutless, or too greedy for political power– to stop the expansion of settlements. But it was certainly possible in the mid-1990s for both sides to build enough confidence and trust to yield a 2-state solution that would not have been a continuation of the occupation, or would have steadily weaned Israel from the occupation over a period of time. Who knows what kinds of borders and economic arrangements might have been engendered if this experiment had succeeded?

    But, under the circumstances, even the most idealistic Israeli dreamer could not seriously propose the kind of 2-state solution you referred to. Perhaps they should have, though. On that, perhaps, we could agree. Perhaps a larger political horizon would have made it easier for PA moderates to summon up the courage and the domestic support needed to clamp down on rejectionists within the territories. And perhaps a conciliatory political horizon that was clearly articulated by the PALESTINIANS would have solidified Israel’s peace camp and made it more politically palatable to clamp down on settlements.

14. John S. Says:
    May 3rd, 2007 at 1:15 pm

    Hi Dan,

    ”Israeli security need not be incompatible with Palestinian “freedom.” It is incompatible with the unchecked freedom to send suicide bombers into restaurants and markets.”

    Actually in this instance – suicide bombers notwithstanding – Israel’s perceived security is completely incompatible with a sovereign Palestinian state.

    First there is the issue of borders. Israel’s argument – which is fairly legitimate – is that if a Palestinian state has control of its own borders, esp. in respect to import/export policy and immigration, the Palestinian state would be able to (or assuming the Palestinian gov’t was acting in good faith, its militants would be able to take advantage of corruption to) import all manner of advanced weaponry and/or volunteer fighters resulting in intolerable cross border security situation for Israel. Giving the legitimacy of this concern, the net result is that the borders of the Palestinian Bantustan would remain under Israeli control either directly or indirectly (via the use of international intermediaries, but with an Israeli security override along the lines of the current Gaza crossing into Egypt) thereby placing all external trade and population movement under perpetual Israeli control. This is absolutely unacceptable in any and all Palestinian-supported two-state scenarios.

    Second there is the natural resources issue, which is interpreted as a security matter (http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-29781-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html). This primarily relates to water presently, though once the natural gas deposits off the Gaza coast are tapped, this will be included as well. The key points of contention at present are access to the Jordan River and the West Bank aquifers.

    As it is, the Jordan River is already under severe threat due to its exploitation by Israel and Jordan even with the existing extreme restrictions on Palestinian water usage in the West Bank (http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/JORDAN.HTM). A sovereign Palestinian state would demand an extreme upsurge in Palestinian access to Jordan River water, a drain that would be not be workable unless Israel dropped its usage, which isn’t on the agenda. In all Israeli-backed plans for a two-state solution, Israel maintains control of the Jordan Valley in part to control the borders and in part to maintain control over the water.

    The West Bank aquifers are also being taxed to an extreme today and Israel’s answer is not to stop using the aquifers for its own purposes (most of northern Israel relies on the W. Bank aquifers) but that the Palestinian statelet is to acquire its water from a massive desalination facility in Caesaria – within Israel Proper - instead (http://www.countercurrents.org/pa-pearce210604.htm). This clearly tightens the Bantustan’s dependency on Israel allowing Israel to simply “turn off the water” should the Bantustan misbehave in some way, the same way Israel controls most of the electricity in Gaza. It is a control mechanism that again is completely and utterly incompatible with any Palestinian-supported notion of independence or acceptable vision for a Palestinian state.

    Third, there is the issue of a functioning Palestinian government that would be required to administrate the Bantustan and is plainly a requirement for security. However, as most honest observers will grant, there is no functioning Palestinian government at all and since neither the PLO nor the PA were designed to serve this function (as discussed in more detail on the other thread) there isn’t even the pretense to a starting point. In this case you end up with something of a Catch-22, an effective Palestinian governmental structure can’t be established as long as Israel maintains direct military occupation (as any such entity would either have to comply with Israeli administration, meaning it is viewed domestically as a quisling force OR it could try to function independently, meaning it would have to be established under IDF fire) and at the same time, Israeli security demands that military occupation be maintained until there is a effective Palestinian government.

    So, even excluding measures that are ostensibly practiced to prevent suicide bombers – such as closure & the Wall – Israeli security still trumps Palestinian independence.

    What has to be understood is that when Israelis and Palestinians are discussing their advocacy for a “two-state solution” they are talking about VERY different ideas of what that actually means. The Geneva Initiative was billed as an effort to bridge these very different notions and completely failed to do so. [It is true when people are given a heavily edited “summary” of the Geneva Initiative it has a reasonable degree of support, but when all the detail is provided and the actual content to the interminable appendixes is revealed, support dwindles significantly. The anti-Geneva Accord Rightists love to show the stats for this and they are correct.] So in many respects it would be more honest to stop pretending that Israelis and Palestinians are talking about the same thing at all, in favor of a “Israeli two-state plan” and a “Palestinian two-state plan” which are entirely different ideas and mutually exclusive.

    ” And Israel’s political system was too dysfunctional –or its leaders were too gutless, or too greedy for political power– to stop the expansion of settlements.”

    I personally disagree with this assessment because it portrays the settlements and settlers as some sort of self-perpetuating “organic” movement with a life of its own that the Israeli government should rein in. While such a characterization might be fair regarding the ideological settlers and their spin-offs like the “Hilltop Youth,” this isn’t true for the vast majority of settlers who there solely because the Israeli government actively promotes their settlement through financial and other incentives. That is, the bulk of the settlers are not part of some “organic” movement that exists separately from the Israeli government, but is the direct consequence of a specific Israeli government policy. Further, the refusal of the Israeli government to end its subsidized settlement policy illustrates that rhetoric notwithstanding; there is no intention to withdraw.

    As for the rest, there really is no value in “crying over spilt milk” though I do agree with your synopsis that both sides are too blame, both sides made grave mistakes and missed opportunities. However, one point that is graphically illustrated in this period leads to another – weaker – line of integrationist reasoning. This point is the grossly disproportionate influence held by the extremists in both camps.

    1994 really made the point quite clearly with al-Ibrahimi Mosque massacre and the subsequent introduction of suicide bombing as a Palestinian tactic. In February of that year Baruch Goldstein carried out his massacre in Occupied Al Khalil (Hevron) and in April Hamas responded specifically to the al-Ibrahimi massacre with the first ever Palestinian suicide bombing at Afula, killing eight people. Despite the radical upsurge in tensions and animosity, the vast majority of people on both sides were not supportive of either of these acts; nevertheless, the propagandists on both sides managed to turn these extremist actions into “representative actions” – the Israelis as a collective were responsible for the massacre, and the Palestinians as a collective for the subsequent massacre.

    This sort of propaganda that supports blaming the “other” as a collective for the actions of the extremists gives the extremists in both camps far too much influence and undermines virtually any trust building measures that are implemented from the top. The radical deterioration in relations between the PA and the Israeli government following these events really drove the point home, though there is no sound evidence whatsoever that the PA or the Israeli government were in anyway culpable for the extremist actions.

    In such a circumstance, where a small cadre of extremists can completely destroy trust between collectives, trust-building has to come from the bottom-up. Undoubtedly, despite the rhetoric that flowed after these events in 1994, those Palestinians with personal Israeli friends and vice-versa didn’t blame their friends – as part of the “enemy” collective – for the actions of the extremists and thus extremist influence on these relationships was marginal at best. Thus the logical conclusion is that trust-building can’t be done by governments representing their people collectively, but must be done by individuals and small groups directly interacting with each other. Thus any form of integration and interaction, communication and cooperation should be encouraged and obviously such interaction undermines the premise that separation is the only answer.

15. Dan F Says:
    May 3rd, 2007 at 1:53 pm

    John,
    You wrote:

    “In my scheme I do not call for the destruction of Israel at all, just the removal of the ethnocentric and exclusivist ideological basis of the state in favor of an ethnicity-neutral and all inclusive state.”

    You have expressed some aspects of this vision in other posts, but for visitors who have not been keeping track, would you please sum up which current Israeli laws or practices would be removed in this bi-national state you are promoting? You seem to be indicating that much of what exists now would remain intact.

    Would Jews have the “right of return” based on the current definition or a modified version of it? If, for example, there is a new upsurge of anti-Semitic violence in France and French Jews want to find refuge in Israel, will that be possible?

    Or would only Palestinians have that right?

    Or would neither have that right?

16. John S. Says:
    May 3rd, 2007 at 3:11 pm

    “It would be possible only when partition was impossible and the dominant settler culture was forced to surrender to the native culture out of fear of eventually losing a liberation struggle.”

    I did want to back track just a bit to comment on this as well.

    With respect to the first condition, most people in our camp (the one-state camp) believe that partition is already impossible assuming it was ever possible to have a viable state in the OPTs. This is not to suggest that there won’t be some separatist schemes along the lines of ghettos (current Qalqilya), reservations (current Gaza), or even a full-fledged Bantustan (the Oslo-model PA); but none of these entities would in anyway be independent or even effectively autonomous and such schemes will not be sustainable either. Most of the one-state camp today reached this conclusion not out of ideological reasoning (like the old anti-Zionist Communists) but did so as a consequence of coming to terms with the notion that effective partition isn’t a real possibility.

    With respect to the second condition, the notion of being “forced to surrender” is a rather tricky one. For example, were the Afrikaners in South Africa “forced” to compromise? By pretty much all accounts, the Apartheid regime had the physical means at its disposal to maintain its order for several more decades, though this would be accompanied by even more brutal repression and violence. I think legitimate arguments can be presented either way.

    However, this is one of the significant differences between the Afrikaner nationalists and the Zionist movement, namely the Afrikaner movement was essentially independent from 1948 on insofar as it was not dependent on a more powerful external protector to maintain its standing. In this respect, the Zionist movement has more in common with the Ulster Protestants, in that both ethnocentric regimes rely almost exclusively on a vastly more powerful external patron to maintain their position; in Ulster it was Britain, in Israel since 1967, it has been the US.

    In Ulster, peace only became an option once the British – the patron – began to lose interest in maintaining Protestant supremacy in the face of constant Catholic opposition and resistance as well as for a myriad of its own domestic reasons. Only when Britain indicated to its Protestant proxies that this situation had to be resolved did the Protestants have any incentive whatsoever to even consider a compromise with the Catholics. As Tom noted it has been a bumpy road, but even with the failure of power-sharing in 2002 there was no regression to the period of “the Troubles” nor has the still sporadic act of terrorism been able to utterly derail the peace process. I argue that this is because Britain refuses to condone – or invest the requisite time, energy, money and resources – absolute Protestant supremacy today. If the British were willing to do so, things would quickly regress as there would be no reason to compromise at all and they could go back to the good old days of preventing Catholic resistance by with ghettoization schemes. It was the British role – not the sudden emergence of a reconciliation movement among the Ulster Protestants – that resulted in the still ongoing peace process.

    I argue that in the Israel/Palestine case, the role of the patron – in this case the U.S. is also a vital component. Noting that Israel is not economically self-sufficient (see Congressional Research Service report: http://www.opencrs.com/document/IB85066 “Israel is not economically self-sufficient, and relies on foreign assistance and borrowing to maintain its economy.”) and completely relies on U.S. diplomatic protection (esp. in the Security Council) to prevent most of the world from imposing South African style economic, political and other sanctions on it, the status quo could not be maintained without US patronage. One of the serious repercussions of the Iraq debacle has been that it is being brought to Washington that the U.S. policy of “Israel – right or wrong!” is a very serious complication for advancing our interests in the region. Virtually all impartial observers recognize that if the U.S. wants to be taken seriously, if it wants active and open friendly cooperation from most of the Arab world, and if it wants to be seen as a benevolent force as opposed to an imperialist exploiter, the whole blind support for anything and everything Israel wants to do has to go. So far, the pro-Israel voices have managed to maintain the status quo, but it really is fairly obvious that this status quo is coming under critical review – and even active attack – from a myriad of different angles and perspectives. Quite simply – and I can go into this elsewhere – US absolute support for Israel is not in our, meaning the US’s, best interest. Further, this reality places a serious moral obligation on people of conscience in the U.S., but I can go into that elsewhere as well.

    The result is that I firmly believe that the patron – the US – has to make it clear that it is no longer willing to maintain its “Israel – right or wrong!” foreign policy before Israel has any incentive to allow for a real peace at all. The patron demanding compromise might be presented as ”forcing” Israeli Jews to the table in Tom’s definition, but then again, maybe not. I differ with Pappe in this respect because I do not believe that a global boycott or isolation campaign is really necessary (realistically even these efforts against South Africa only had a limited effect in direct terms), instead the entire effort should be focused on ending US support, at which time Israel will have to come up with a workable alternative. Israel has placed all its eggs in the US basket now, so there is only one basket that we have to unweave to radically change the situation.

17. John S. Says:
    May 3rd, 2007 at 4:02 pm

    ”You have expressed some aspects of this vision in other posts, but for visitors who have not been keeping track, would you please sum up which current Israeli laws or practices would be removed in this bi-national state you are promoting? You seem to be indicating that much of what exists now would remain intact.”

    This is where your earlier criticism about me telling people what is best for them becomes a bit more legitimate, because of course all of these details would have to be worked out by the participants. Nevertheless, I am entitled to have an opinion, so please keep these responses in that context. These sort of details might make for a nice paper for a one-state conference or the like, but should not be read as even recommendations.

    ”Would Jews have the “right of return” based on the current definition or a modified version of it?” If, for example, there is a new upsurge of anti-Semitic violence in France and French Jews want to find refuge in Israel, will that be possible?”

    I would argue yes, this should be maintained but extended to include Palestinians. Frankly this role of Israel as the “refuge of last resort” is the most compelling case for the continuance of the Israeli state as such (at least among many people that I’ve talked to), but this does not necessarily mean that the state has to be exclusively controlled by Jews. Such a protection can be constitutionally guaranteed and even in a minority position protected by making repeal only permissible by a minority-specific referendum. That is, only the Jewish community could vote to repeal this constitutional clause (there would be similar community-specific rights for other groups as well).

    As I’m sure you know, a Jew doesn’t just land in Tel Aviv and become a citizen, instead there is a bureaucratic process that begins with obtaining an oleh certificate and then moves through a series of stages eventually resulting in full citizenship. I would suggest that this part of the existing system be maintained, but also complimented with a similar system for gradually reintegrating the Palestinian refugees and others with a clear right to residency within Israel/Palestine. One of the nightmare scenarios raised in response to the Palestinian refugees is the image of a massive uncontrolled flood of penniless refugees flooding the country. I would suggest that the Right of Return can be implemented in a controlled fashion for those that choose to return (which would not be all) that Israel is uniquely set up to handle through its experience with processing and integrating Jewish olim.

    As lots of folks like to point out – including your earlier citation of Dror – ethnicity and ties to the country is something of a norm for expedited citizenship in many countries; my primary objection is that this is true for Jews, but not for Palestinians. Either mutually extend this right, or mutually repeal it.

18. Richard Witty Says:
    May 3rd, 2007 at 6:17 pm

    No country is independant from aid, debt, trade. Israel is no exception.

    MANY countries have treaties that result in either military commitment between states, or even military funding commitment. Israel is no exception.

    That Israel has been historically isolated for existing at all, is itself self-fulfilling.

    That status is potentially changing with the now relatively long-term treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and with the prospects of much wider application indicated by the Saudi proposal.

    The nature of Israel as Jewish haven is desirable, and periodically necessary.

    The traumas of most of the last century are still relevant motivation. No confidence has been offered.

19. Peter H Says:
    May 5th, 2007 at 1:58 am

    I would say this in response to Robert Mnookin, Tom Mitchell & Leonard Fein: When you have two groups with clashing narratives & identities rooted in the same homeland, any solution is going to be accompanied by conflict. People who (rightly) point out the potential problems in a binational, consociational, or federal regime ignore the problems inherent in a 2-state solution along, say, the lines of the Geneva Accords. Some issues that would be a constant source of tension between Israelis & Palestinians:

    (1) Whether we like it or not, the demand of Palestinian refugees to exercise their right to return is not going to go away. This demand is expressed not only as an issue of individual property rights, but also as a collective right, i.e. the attachment of Palestinians to pre-1948 Palestine, or what is now Israel. The refugees (especially the ones living in third countries) will attempt to block any solution that does not include a right of return.

    Even if political circumstances changed, and something like the Geneva Accords were enacted, an independent Palestinian state would house millions of Palestinians who have countless claims in Israel that are not addressed. This can only be a source of insecurity to both peoples.

    (2) Ending the Israeli occupation and creating an independent Palestinian state would only partialy alleviate Palestine’s economic & social problems. For example, the Gaza Strip would still be tiny, isolated, & overcrowded. Most Palestinian trade routes would still go through Israel. Economically, Palestinians would continue to be dependent on Israel, which, again, would only be a source of insecurity for both groups.

    (3) A new Palestinian state surrounded by Israel would continue to be subject to intimidation by the superior Israeli army. Moreover, Israelis would not feel secure watching a Palestinian state build an army next door knowing that there are millions of Palestinians who have many claims in Israel.

    (4) A two state solution ignores the issues and concerns of “Palestinian Israelis”, i.e the Palestinian population inside Israel’s pre-1967 borders.

    I’m not an expert on comparative politics, but I agree that consociational democracy, as least as defined by Lijphart,is probably not a good model for resolving Israel-Palestine. A more realistic model would be for two sovereign states joined together in a federal political and economic union, as proposed by Alternative Palestinian Agenda.

    Whatever the problems of problem-sharing in Cyprus & Northern Ireland, none of the proposed solutions to these conflicts have included partition. And for those who mention Yugoslavia as an example of the perils of binationalism, I would point out that partition has been rejected a solution for multinational Bosnia. Indeed, as Meron Benvenisti has pointed out, the Dayton Accords provide one model of a “soft partition”.

20. John S. Says:
    May 5th, 2007 at 10:24 am

    Hi Peter,

    ” When you have two groups with clashing narratives & identities rooted in the same homeland, any solution is going to be accompanied by conflict. People who (rightly) point out the potential problems in a binational, consociational, or federal regime ignore the problems inherent in a 2-state solution along, say, the lines of the Geneva Accords.”

    This is very true. There is presumption that separation would be “easier” or “more realistic,” but when if comes down to the actual details it becomes fairly clear that this isn’t really the case. The separatist agenda would only be easier and more realistic if it followed the Palestinian two-state idea, of true and total separation; but this has NEVER been part of the Israeli two-state notion and there is no reason to believe that it ever will be. Those opposed to the one-state suggestion highlight that for such a scenario to work, it will take many years and probably involve considerable extremist violence, but despite the implication to the contrary, the exact same is true for a viable two-state option as well.

    ”(1) Whether we like it or not, the demand of Palestinian refugees to exercise their right to return is not going to go away. This demand is expressed not only as an issue of individual property rights, but also as a collective right, i.e. the attachment of Palestinians to pre-1948 Palestine, or what is now Israel. The refugees (especially the ones living in third countries) will attempt to block any solution that does not include a right of return.”

    This is one element of the equation that the Zionist Left tends to “write off” as a non-issue; and despite the willingness of the PLO to betray this Palestinian population, for most Palestinians – who have direct relatives who are refugees even if they are not refugees themselves – this is a very real issue that isn’t going to just go away. Interestingly, the existing Israeli state is uniquely qualified to deal with this issue based on its experience with integrating olim from diverse backgrounds and cultures into the state. Existing Israeli absorption schemes makes the reintegration of those Palestinian refugees that would want to return completely realistic in a fashion that does not threaten to overwhelm the state, but of course this could only work in a post- or non- Zionist state, bring us back to the theme of the other thread, it’s the ideology, not the state, that has to go.

    ”Even if political circumstances changed, and something like the Geneva Accords were enacted, an independent Palestinian state would house millions of Palestinians who have countless claims in Israel that are not addressed. This can only be a source of insecurity to both peoples.”

    Personally, I do not believe that the restoration of precise properties is realistic at all, especially in view of how extensively the Israeli state modified Palestine over the last fifty-nine years. Further, the refugee resolution that enshrines their rights does not specifically require this, just return and/or compensation. On the upside, the fact that the Israeli government legally holds most of the land in the state means that the state can utilize what land is necessary for the reintroduction and integration of those refugees demanding return without having to violate the rights of private land holders for the most part. The JNF/KKL pretense that its lands are immune to state policy has been shot down in the courts, so even that objection is no longer a bar to progress. This is a compromise position, but I believe that most of the refugees in the worst situations – such as those in Lebanon – would find this an acceptable compromise if offered. The most passionate opposition to such a scheme would probably come from the scions of the old Palestinian landed gentry, the old land holders, but they represent a small enough minority and typically escaped in good enough personal circumstances that I suspect their demands for the precise restitution of all properties they once held could be acceptably ignored.

    ”(4) A two state solution ignores the issues and concerns of “Palestinian Israelis”, i.e the Palestinian population inside Israel’s pre-1967 borders.”

    I personally believe that it is this population that is the vanguard of the one state movement. They are the ones that are constantly putting pressure on and challenging the pretense to Israel being both “Jewish” and “democratic” and forcing Israelis to come down on one side or the other and highlighting the hypocrisy. The existing Israeli state – including at least some of its minority protections and judicial decisions – is the basis of the one-state notion being built upon the existing Israeli state. Getting rid of the ideology that demands ethnocentric domination and building on the existing Israeli state is, in my opinion, the most realistic way forward for the one state agenda.

    ”Whatever the problems of problem-sharing in Cyprus & Northern Ireland, none of the proposed solutions to these conflicts have included partition. And for those who mention Yugoslavia as an example of the perils of binationalism, I would point out that partition has been rejected a solution for multinational Bosnia. Indeed, as Meron Benvenisti has pointed out, the Dayton Accords provide one model of a “soft partition”.”

    In fact, it should also be kept in mind that the most egregious abuses happened as a result of separatist efforts. The ethnic cleansing in Bosnia occurred AFTER Bosnia sought to break away from Yugoslavia, and though there was violence that resulted in this move, it went to an entirely new level of magnitude once separation became the issue. The same is true in Kosovo the effort to separate led to the worst violence, though there was smaller scale violence before hand. In Israel/Palestine, there is constant conflict, but one can make the case – esp. in view of the extremist reactions from both sides in 1994 and in the face of the Gaza Disengagement – that a realistic separatist scheme would likely result in a massive escalation in violence. Conversely, integration can be done slowly and through political and legal change without a clear cut “breaking point” being hit that would stimulate a sudden escalation in violence.

21. Richard Witty Says:
    May 6th, 2007 at 2:06 pm

    The questions articulated are resolvable within a two-state solution.

    Again, not to the level of meeting the demands set by the parties, but to the level of meeting the needs of the parties.

22. Dan F Says:
    May 6th, 2007 at 8:49 pm

    If we are trying to measure how difficult it would be to implement either option, they are both very very long shots. Like Shlomo Ben-Ami, I don’t think it is possible for either side to take the necessary steps to compromise without some kind of international umbrella, led by the U.S.

    So, again I come back to what is politically feasible in this country. Moving the political chess pieces in this country to push hard for Israeli withdrawal from large swaths of the occupied territory will be extremely dififcult. If it happens, it will be a paradigmatic shift in the way America’s political elite deal with the conflict. But it is not impossible for me to imagine.

    It is not beyond the realm of the plausible that a new political bloc of American Jews and other Americans will emerge and call for even-handedness, for pressure on both sides as opposed to pressure on one side. It is much less likely, but still not inconceivable, that such a political bloc could call for the kind of free-standing, unbeholden Palestinian state –protected by international mandate and an international peacekeeping force–that John and Peter say is impossible.

    But it is impossible for me to imagine that a solid bloc of Americans (who have historically backed Israel through thick and thin) would ever give political permission to an American President to discard the Jewish state, and to countenance a system in which Jews are forced to be a minority group in Israel-Palestine. Mind you, I also don’t think it is fair or just to deprive Jews of the right of self-determination that is enshrined in international law, and nothing you guys have said has convinced me that this right -or, for that matter, the safety of Jews in Tel Aviv and Ashdod and Netanya– would be assured in one state. The only way to protect the rights of both peoples to self-determination is to give each a state. But even if I thought otherwise, I would not consider the one-state option to be realistic because America would never allow it.

    At a certain point, one has to rely on one’s visceral sense of what is feasible. And if this really is your dream, John and Peter, I don’t see how you could create the circumstances in which America would allow it to happen.

23. Richard Witty Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 1:34 am

    I think it is a worthy goal to try to create the conditions of mutual acceptance that is a prerequisite of single-state.

    I wish that that was the effort that the single-state advocates were making.

    That is NOT the effort that I read from Saif, Ali Abumenah, John and others.

    The effort that I read is the one of forcing compliance. 90% of the efforts are on pressure on Israel, 10% or less on the commitments (personal and political) to demonstrate trust.

    A long shot that even the proponents are not investing in.

24. Richard Witty Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 6:35 am

    Dan,
    I think your site has been “branded” as a Zionist site.

    Post-Zionists might feel like there is a prospect in posting and dialoging here, but anti-Zionists I expect quickly run into a brick wall.

    If things got to “what side are you on?” (which it is relative to the prospect of punitively oriented agitation), then we’d be considered enemy, regardless of our degree of sympathy for the Palestinian people and good recomendations and efforts to help, both politically and tangibly.

    I hope that its not that far along. That is what I sense from the one-state prospect, that the anger and resistance comes first and the reconciliation merely barely an afterthought.

    Kind of like Olmert feeling compelled to do something about Hezbollah, but not thinking out the subsequent steps. Or like George W feeling who knows what, but not thinking out the subsequent steps.

    Is the term “democracy” merely a slogan, or is indended to have content, even if elements conflicts with the goals and methods of militancy?

25. John S. Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 12:58 pm

    Hi Dan,

    ”If we are trying to measure how difficult it would be to implement either option, they are both very very long shots.”

    I agree.

    ”Like Shlomo Ben-Ami, I don’t think it is possible for either side to take the necessary steps to compromise without some kind of international umbrella, led by the U.S.”

    On this score, I disagree because it is based on the two-state Madrid/Oslo paradigm; specifically the notion of bilateral agreement between the Israeli government on one side and the PLO ostensibly representing all Palestinians on the other and is only focused on the OPTs. However, this is a false representation of the actual situation.

    First you have the 1948 Palestinians, those holding Israeli citizenship, and despite the desperate measures the Israeli gov’t is taking (the Shin bet declaration that it would oppose even legal action, the current libel against Bishara, &c.), the Israeli Palestinians are not showing any signs of being cowed into their former status of quiet non-people within the “Jewish State.” However, their demand for equality in Israel is obviously the vanguard of the one state movement. In fact I personally consider their struggle for equality within Israel to be vastly more important than anything the PLO has to say as a stepping stone for peace.

    Second, you have the external refugee population that is not democratically represented by the PLO and has – as a collective – flatly rejected the PLO’s right to negotiate away their rights. So regardless of what Abbas & gang have to say about it, they cannot solve the refugee issue and whatever they say will not be effectively binding. Moreover, since most of these refugees lay claim to rights inside the Green Line, the notion of one-state co-existence is much more popular in this quarter and thus their future is more closely connected to – and represented by – the struggle of the 1948 Palestinians than anything the PLO has to say about it.

    Finally, even within the OPTs, the election of Hamas – a non-PLO group - certainly calls into question the Pas democratic credentials and at the same time the Israeli closure policy has effectively destroyed any pretense to centralized power for the PA. Since the PLO has focused exclusively on the PA since 1993, one can legitimately question the value of the PA even as a tame token “partner” to agree to Israeli demands. The PA simply can’t deliver regardless of the rhetoric coming from its corrupt little wannabe oligarchs.

    It isn’t so much that the Palestinian side can’t make the concessions that Israel demands, but more that there is no unified “Palestinian side” at all and in its absence, people like me are looking to the 1948 Palestinians and their stable representative and properly organized political formations – as well as their radical Israeli allies – to take point in defining the struggle.

    ”It is not beyond the realm of the plausible that a new political bloc of American Jews and other Americans will emerge and call for even-handedness, for pressure on both sides as opposed to pressure on one side. It is much less likely, but still not inconceivable, that such a political bloc could call for the kind of free-standing, unbeholden Palestinian state –protected by international mandate and an international peacekeeping force–that John and Peter say is impossible.”

    Not necessarily impossible in the physical sense, but it still isn’t going to happen. Like my earlier comment about the United States renouncing its claim to Manhattan Island (middle of NYC) and returning it to the Native Americans. Technically, in a physical sense, this could be done. However, there is no plan to do so, no intention to do so, and virtually no likelihood of it happening, it isn’t even on the agenda of realistic actions that anyone takes seriously. The same is true for a complete withdrawal from the OPTs. Physically it is possible, but there is absolutely no reason to believe that it will ever happen.

    ”But it is impossible for me to imagine that a solid bloc of Americans (who have historically backed Israel through thick and thin) would ever give political permission to an American President to discard the Jewish state, and to countenance a system in which Jews are forced to be a minority group in Israel-Palestine. … But even if I thought otherwise, I would not consider the one-state option to be realistic because America would never allow it.”

    Now here you raise an important point, specifically the role of the United States.

    First, as should indicate that I hold the United States directly culpable for the current situation based on the patronage argument alluded to in a previous post. Specifically, as long as the US is willing (and able) to support Israel regardless of what it does, for better or worse, Israel has no incentive – none whatsoever – to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. It took a dramatic gesture threatening to end this “Israel – Right or Wrong” position to get Israel to even agree to the Oslo redeployment (when James Baker under Papa Bush threatened to cut off aid to Israel if it didn’t stop rapid settlement expansion, a “sin” that has never been forgiven as seen with the release of the Baker Commission report about Iraq). So a big part of my advocacy is that we Americans – Jewish or otherwise – are directly responsible and have every right to play a direct role in this conflict. It is our fault that Israel has no reason to compromise and thus every death resulting from a lack of compromise is the direct responsibility of the United States.

    Second, I do not believe a Jewish counter-lobby representing a more moderate or even handed position is in the cards either. I’ve commented on this before in a different thread and frankly the more moderate Jewish community is likely to simply disengage from the whole issue than to get into what would inevitably be a monstrously acrimonious conflict with the “Israel – Right or Wrong!” crowd. The thing about being an American – even a Jewish-American – is that you really don’t have to deal with this issue at all if you’re not inclined to, and many – maybe even a majority – Jewish-Americans do just that, ignore the issue altogether. A Jewish counter-lobby would have to compete – in an extremely hostile atmosphere – for the hearts and minds of those Jews that are currently involved and concerned by the issue, a group that is already heavily dependent of on one or the other factions of the existing “Lobby” (all the elements combined into a collective). I don’t see it happening.

    Third, many of us have adopted a different strategy for dealing with the lobby, namely publicizing it and demanding total U.S. disengagement altogether. The US is coming to face a myriad of new pressures – many of which are the product of Bush & his rubber-stamp Republican Congress, but won’t actually be felt until he is out of office – and when it comes right down to it, most Americans are not very enthusiastic about foreign aid at all for allies or otherwise. Our case is that there are better uses for the billions we give Israel (as well as Egypt as part of our bribery arrangement that is a core part of the 1979 Camp David Agreement) each year. Of course most of this aid is spent – by condition – with US arms manufacturers, but even this isn’t really required now that Bush has us enmeshed in what is promising to be a state of near constant war for decades to come (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and so on).

    The traditional argument of Israel’s geopolitical and strategic usefulness to the United States really hasn’t been accurate since the first Gulf War when we gained a permanent foothold throughout the Arab world and in fact had to literally bribe Israel not to respond to Saddam’s Scud attacks to maintain our regional coalition. (The bribe included some 10 billion in additional loan guarantees, the technology that is now Israel’s Arrow missile defense system, and so on). Since then, US support for Israel has been a geopolitical liability. There is nothing Israel can provide that our other allies and dependencies in the region cannot and unlike during the Cold War, we now have a permanent foothold throughout the region, from Djibouti in Africa, to virtually all the Gulf States, to Afghanistan and our NATO ally Turkey. Further, Israel is specifically discouraged from participating directly with US forces in the region for fear of undermining other relationships: there was a valid reason that the US built its air support base for Iraq in Jordan instead of Israel.

    On the economic front, Israel produces very little that the US needs or wants, which is why it is the EU, not the US, that serves as Israel’s primary export market. Further, in the face of constant conflict, the real basis for continue capital inflows isn’t Israel’s economy as such, but the fact that it is backed by the United States via loan guarantees, i.e. the US assures investors that they are covered if they invest in Israel. Finally Israel’s logical overemphasis on high-tech (and thus expensive) military/security products forces Israel to find markets that need their technology AND have the money to afford it, countries like China and India, which does not necessarily serve US strategic interests. The most recent major conflict – though downplayed publicly – between the US and Israel regarded Israeli technology transfers to China, and a new one is brewing since it seems that China’s new fighter aircraft is something of a reincarnation of the cancelled US-funded Lavi fighter project from Israel.
    Quite specifically, Israel no longer holds any practical importance for US interests, our support is now sentimental, not strategic.

    Further, even this sentimental support rests upon a weak foundation. Contrary to the implied relationship you mention, for the vast majority of Americans it doesn’t matter in the least. Many in the Jewish-American community care, many in the Arab/Muslim community (which is now about the same size as the Jewish community and growing much faster and much more politically active) care, and the Christian Zionists care; but that’s about it.

    However, the active element of the Jewish-American community is primarily monopolized by the right-wing “Lobby” and though there is moderate opposition (like JVP), for the most part those Jewish-Americans not involved in the right-wing effort just aren’t involved at all.

    The Arab/Muslim community is increasing in both numbers and political significance (Bush would never have won in 2000 had not the 80,000 Muslims in Florida that voted for him not done so). In many respects this community is fundamentally conservative, but has been turned away by more traditional (White Christian) elements of the existing US conservative movement. This has put them in a similar situation as the disengaged Jewish-Americans, they just aren’t participating at all.

    Nevertheless, their kids – especially the American-born Arab/Muslim Americans are coming out aggressively on the Left, they’re liberal (as opposed to their conservative parents), educated, industrious and they’re pissed at being stereotyped in the post-9/11 US. They’re Muslim, but uniquely Muslim-American. One traditional stance that hasn’t shifted at all – and is even gaining a new found popularity – is the fate of their Palestinian cousins and the role of the US in that fate. Coupled with these folks, the Palestinian narrative is finally found an audience in the US among other groups as well. The end result is that for the first time in US history – at least since 1967 – there is a strong and growing US constituency that openly questions and opposes the US “Israel – Right or Wrong” stance, something that the existing lobby has never had to deal with before.

    The third group that cares, and frankly provides the rank-and-file of Israel advocacy today, are the Christian Zionists with their enthusiastic desire to lump all of us godless Jews in Israel so Jesus can come back and cast us all into hell… Luckily for the anti-Zionist position, this initiative is being spearheaded by John Hagee and his “Christians United for Israel.” On the Jewish side, you can’t really deny he’s a open unabashed anti-Semite after going on record as publicly blaming the Jews themselves for the Holocaust, essentially arguing that the Jewish people got what it deserved for turning our backs on God. Ahem. On the Christian side, he is also written off as something of a nut because he argues that Jews get something of a “free pass” into heaven even without accepting Jesus (this is how he argues against missionary activity and is thus beloved by groups like the ADL); whereas that runs in direct contrast to virtually all Christian denominations and esp. the fundamentalists, who believe the only way to heaven is through Jesus. So, in the end, I believe Hagee is heading for a train wreck one way or the other – either losing most Jewish support, or most Christian support, or (best case scenario) virtually all support. Further the Christian Right in general is now fragmenting and redirecting their efforts toward domestic concerns (echoing the growing trend throughout the country), so it is debatable how long the Christian Zionists will play an active role.

    So the core dynamics of Israel advocacy – and opposition – are changing in the United States already, and this is a trend that will only increase as domestic pressures continue to increase and people come to understand that our foreign military adventurism isn’t going to end anytime soon despite having no purpose, no goal, and thus no chance of “success” (since this isn’t even defined). For folks like me, our job is to constantly raise awareness of US support for Israel to a population that is not all that sympathetic in the first place and demand that the US disengage altogether. In such a scenario, Israel will have no choice but to get off its imperious high horse and deal honestly for a viable solution.

    Finally, Israel has put all its faith in US support, but if you look at the history of other states and regimes that have done this one has to note that it isn’t really the wisest course of action. Manuel Noriega, Mohammad Aidid, and even Saddam Hussein were all US proxies that the US later opted to turn against. Even after most of the world had turned against the Apartheid regime (a situation that Israel is already in) it was the US & UK that almost single-handedly kept the white regime functioning arguing that it served vital strategic interests as a check to Communism. However, once there was enough domestic pressure against it, finally the US decided that it wasn’t worth the trouble, US support ended and the regime collapsed within a couple of years. This is the inspiration and model we’re following for ending US support for Israel, build up domestic pressure since Israel really doesn’t serve any useful purpose for us or our interests. Not to mention ending the “Israel – Right or Wrong!” stance would do wonders for our standing throughout the world, a public relations triumph.

    Counting on perpetual US support is a fool’s gamble.

26. Dan F Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 1:20 pm

    Richard,

    I know what you mean about the anger that always seems to well up in those proposing a 1-state solution. But that’s the context in which we all must function. Right wing Jews have their own brand of anger that also wells up. I tend to be angry at anti-Semitism on the far left.

    In the best dialogue groups, Palestinians and Israelis –or American Jews and American Muslim–go through a process in which anger gets expressed and shared, but eventually there is recognition of the presence of 2 distinct narratives, too distinct national movements.

    Eventually there is often an understanding that anger leads nowhere and accomplishes nothing. And eventually, the possibility of working together for a shared future is sometimes accepted.

    But such dialogues require talented faciliators. They require the right setting. They require face to face contact. On the Internet, all that we get are unmediated blurbs and lectures. When the anger wells up, there is nothing that can be done about it except explain why it isn’t useful and/or wait until it passes.

    That said, I have been impressed by the lack of anger and the abundance of lucidity exhibited by John S.

27. Dan F Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 2:32 pm

    John,

    I still don’t understand how you intend to get from A to B.

    Rely entirely on “1948 Palestinians” and “Israeli radicals” and, I presume, a 1-state movement in the U.S. and Europe that you hope will be comparable in strength to the anti-apartheid movement? You seem to blithely dismiss the Palestinians in the territories as if it doesn’t matter what role they play. That might fit into the abstract schema you have in mind but it doesn’t conform to the realities on the ground.

    You seem to rely on “folks like you” to completely change the American government’s –and the American people’s- views about Israel. I presume that you are referring to –for lack of a better word– the far left in this country. What have they accomplished since, say, the 1930s? The country is moving towards the center, and it is the center that must be moved to help solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem, and the center wants no part of, say, the left wing of Moveon.org or the people who love The Nation or..(who else did you have in mind?)

    The only way to persuade elected officials in this country is with money or grassroote pressure. Do you honestly think you will be able to muster up enough of either one to change the minds of more than a few politicians? And do you honestly think that is more likely than a dovish American Jewish alternative to the current, mainstream pro-Israel lobby?

28. Richard Witty Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 3:18 pm

    “Physically it is possible, but there is absolutely no reason to believe that it will ever happen.”

    The reason that it is possible is the combination of Palestinian unity government (if it matures), and the sincere proposal of the Arab states (if it is sincere, which I think it is).

    The combination of those two efforts give Israel a LOT, and for a lot. It represents a transition from ambiguity to clarity.

    “The traditional argument of Israel’s geopolitical and strategic usefulness to the United States really hasn’t been accurate since the first Gulf War when we gained a permanent foothold throughout the Arab world and in fact had to literally bribe Israel not to respond to Saddam’s Scud attacks to maintain our regional coalition.”

    Israel’s role would shift from regional military anchor to a regional economic anchor, as its influence has been on Jordan for example (which now actually has a growing high-technology sector).

    The regional marketplace is THE goal of US involvement in the region. Oil is temporary.

    Israel’s relationship to the US is not accurately of dependancy as much as you describe. Definitely Israel would have to adjust to changes in US relationship, but it would survive.

    The influence of Christian groups in Israeli politics is definitely confusing. Many Christians are sincere and kind. Many are highly ideological, with ends justifying means.

    Including the means of infiltration and confusion of Jewish identity, as well as the external “motivation” of furthering the apocapolyptic.

    Like all challenges, these motivate to clarify and find balance, nut and root.

29. John S. Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 3:31 pm

    ”I still don’t understand how you intend to get from A to B.”

    Unless I’m misreading you, that’s just it, there is no “from A to B” we’re at “B” already. As you read this, the de facto reality on the ground is one state with an ethnocentric state ideology that dictates only a portion of the population has full rights. The goal is to oust this ideological block, all the rest the can stay, so there is no movement from the current reality to a new one in a physical sense, just an honest assessment of the current reality and an ideological adjustment.

    ”Rely entirely on “1948 Palestinians” and “Israeli radicals” and, I presume, a 1-state movement in the U.S. and Europe that you hope will be comparable in strength to the anti-apartheid movement?”

    No, just a comparable movement focused on the US, the rest of the world, for the most part, is already on board. The struggle of the 1948 Palestinians is the struggle for one state, the other two major Palestinian populations (those in the OPTs & external refugees) have no meaningful representation or effective political structures to advance their agenda(s) at all. Azmi Bishara honestly represents the interests of more Palestinians than Mahmoud Abbas does.

    ”You seem to blithely dismiss the Palestinians in the territories as if it doesn’t matter what role they play. That might fit into the abstract schema you have in mind but it doesn’t conform to the realities on the ground.”

    I didn’t say that, but it cannot be denied that they have no coherent voice or effective political structure to represent it, esp. since the Hamas elections ended the pretense that the PLO/Fatah represents the vast majority of Palestinians in the OPTs. There simply is no legitimate voice today representing the Palestinians of the OPTs. In the absence of a cohesive position and an effective body to present and negotiate that position, there is – to recite Kadima’s perpetual refrain – “no partner.”

    ”You seem to rely on “folks like you” to completely change the American government’s –and the American people’s- views about Israel.”

    Not at all, most Americans just don’t care, or don’t care very much. I know its hard to get through the heads of many Jewish-Americans, but the reality is that this just isn’t a key issue to your average American. There are small, vocal, and influential minorities who care, but this was discussed in detail previously. All we have to do is make it “more trouble than it is worth” for the political elites to maintain the status quo. Some people are already reaching this conclusion on their own for the reasons alluded to before (lack of geopolitical value, a strategic liability, no economic benefit, &c.) as well as others. In the end we derive inspiration from the model of grassroots organizing and making the issue “cool” used by the Anti-Apartheid movement, the Save Darfur movement, and the Free Tibet movement. It has been – and can be – done here. However, since it is done in a very decentralized fashion, it is hard to gauge progress. I am hoping that the June 10-11 mobilization will provide some clue as to how things are developing.

    ”The only way to persuade elected officials in this country is with money or grassroote pressure. Do you honestly think you will be able to muster up enough of either one to change the minds of more than a few politicians?”

    We can’t really compete with the money, but we can with the pressure. The point is, most – and there are a few exceptions – US politicians aren’t dedicated Israel supporters either. They support Israel because there is an incentive to do so (AIPAC & friends) and no incentive not to (they stand to gain nothing by taking a principled stand). That is, however, changing and I know this for a fact. Many politicians are trying to run a neutral course; just ignoring the issue altogether in public and privately doing as “recommended” by the Lobby. Even that is getting more difficult though. Quite simply, a cohesive opposition camp IS forming and this is something AIPAC & friends have never really had to deal with before and the individual politicians aren’t sure how to proceed. For right now, the majority is still siding with the Lobby, but that is changing, I’ve seen it change enormously over the last ten years and within another ten – at the current rate – I think we’ll be successful.

    ”And do you honestly think that is more likely than a dovish American Jewish alternative to the current, mainstream pro-Israel lobby?”

    Yes, frankly I do. It is the “dovish” American Jewish population that is least likely to be interested in hopping into a mud-slinging match with the right-wingers. All AIPAC & friends will have to do is launch a few well placed jabs hurling “Anti-Semite!” and “Self-Hating Traitor!” and a good portion of the “dovish” Jewish Americans will just go home and disengage from the issue altogether; no Jewish-American HAS to deal with this issue if they prefer not to.

30. John S. Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 4:04 pm

    Hi Richard,

    A couple new topics that I haven’t already addressed…

    ”The regional marketplace is THE goal of US involvement in the region. Oil is temporary.”

    Nonsense. Beyond the oil, the region taken as a whole doesn’t provide anything that we – as in the US – need or can’t get elsewhere cheaper and easier. Further, truth be told, we only take a minority of our oil needs from the region as well if you exclude Saudi Arabia. The issue isn’t so much that we NEED the oil, but the geopolitical significance of CONTROLLING the oil and using it as leverage to advance other interests. A regional trade bloc might be of use to Europe – who does import a lot of Middle Eastern produce, Israeli and otherwise – and would be of value to the participating states, but the US has no vested interest in it.

    ”Israel’s relationship to the US is not accurately of dependancy as much as you describe. Definitely Israel would have to adjust to changes in US relationship, but it would survive.”

    It is a relationship of dependency and protection, though not completely economic/financial. If we were only talking about the economic relationship, you are correct; but this is coupled with US diplomatic protection and “influence” as well. The only reason Jordan and Egypt have entered into economic/trade relationships with Israel is because we made that a condition for economic/trade relationships with us. Further, without US diplomatic protection – esp. in the UN Security Council – the world community would have taken measures to curtail Israeli practices all the way back to the 1970’s. Without that diplomatic protection, Israel would be facing a whole new list of potential problems, esp. in respect to economics and trade. Make no mistake about it, Israel is a US dependency.

    All the other issues you’ve raised in this post have already been addressed at one point or another.

31. Richard Witty Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 4:58 pm

    I think you misunderstand what is occurring in the region and what is desired.

    There is conflict within the Arab world. They note that there is no moving back to the quaint.

    And, I think you misunderstand the nature of the relationship between Israel and the US, and that misunderstanding would lead you to faulty, and ultimately suppressive political stance.

    The path to a two-state solution is MUCH closer than it has ever been, and is factually close.

    There are many that desire the two-state reconciliation to never occur. They include Islamicists for whom reconciliation represents a fundamental compromise of Islamic dominance, and Islamic norms.

    They also include, as you refer, some of the Palestinian refugees. (Moreso the poorer ones that have been asked to remain as refugees in “resistance”. The wealthier diaspora Palestinians love the possibility of cosmopolitan Palestine, and the free trade zone that the neo-cons propose. Most of the professional diaspora Palestinians regard Israel as closer to their model than Hamas is.)

    Even if a two-state solution is just a large island, and not a full-fledged continent of equality, it is MUCH better than being at sea.

    And, as I’ve described earlier, unless a centrist civilist majority forms up and makes strong links within Israel and Palestine to constitute a compelling majority, the strength of the fringes only leads to very violent, and minimally resolvable civil war.

    The militant approaches strengthen the fringes and diminish the voice of the civil, kind and practical middle, in favor of the raving.

    I’d be ashamed to risk encouraging that militancy.

    It is so far from ANY basis of confidence, and going farther away from it by agitation.

    Israel will face problems. Problems are part of life.

    The good effort is to solve problems, not to exacerbate them.

32. Richard Witty Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 5:25 pm

    And, still the desire of Jews to SELF-govern continues.

    Absent the predominance of the civil middle among Palestinian voices, ethnic Israeli and diaspora Jews are much more sympathetic with civil middle that does most represent Israeli politics.

    Zionism is not nutty. It is very understandable, practical, and possible to accomplish kindly.

    Messianic urges (as in historical apolyptic prophecy) are nutty. Its nutty whether it comes from neo-orthodox Jews for whom Eretz Yisroel is the messiah, fraudulent Christian “Jews” hoping for the apocalypse, jihadists, and newbies to the prophetic.

    I don’t understand how progressives can deny a people’s self-governance, and stand by that ideologically without significant rationalization.

33. John S. Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 5:44 pm

    Hi Richard,

    ”I think you misunderstand what is occurring in the region and what is desired. …”

    LOL. I’ve made most of what is a cohesive case (there are some elements that haven’t been explored here yet) and you haven’t actually countered anything, beyond making the generalized and unsubstantiated statement that ‘it isn’t true” and moving on. If anyone has a gross misunderstanding to the situation I would argue that it is the Zionist Left, as is graphically illustrated by its diminishing significance in Israel and abroad. The one state movement is a growing one, the Zionist Left is a declining one; there is a reason for that and wishful thinking won’t change it.

    ”The path to a two-state solution is MUCH closer than it has ever been, and is factually close.”

    Well quit just saying this as though it makes it true and substantiate – argue – your case. I’ve provided a myriad of reasons why I don’t think this is in anyway true and you have neither countered my arguments nor provided your own substantiating the case. If a realistic sustainable two-state solution is “MUCH” closer, explain your perspective. Simply saying so – expressing your hopes – isn’t a sound argument at all.

    There are many that desire the two-state reconciliation to never occur. They include Islamicists for whom reconciliation represents a fundamental compromise of Islamic dominance, and Islamic norms.

    Assuming you are referring to Hamas, then this is factually incorrect. Hamas reconciled itself to a two-state solution a long time ago, even before the current intifada, but of course it serves Israeli interests to pretend otherwise, just as it served their interest to argue that Arafat was no partner and so on and so forth. There is ALWAYS an excuse to not negotiate. There are some Islamist extremists – exemplified by Palestinian Islamic Jihad – that have maintained an absolute refusal to support a two-state option, but they are tiny minority, completely on par with the Kahanist minorities in the W. Bank that also reject a two-state solution. In both cases though – as again discussed before – these small minorities have grossly disproportionate influence.

34. John S. Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 5:54 pm

    ”And, still the desire of Jews to SELF-govern continues. … I don’t understand how progressives can deny a people’s self-governance, and stand by that ideologically without significant rationalization.”

    Blah, blah, blah. We’ve gone over this repeatedly and you STILL haven’t addressed the problem with “Jewish self-governance;” namely that they are imposing this “self-governance” on people that are not part of the defined “self”. If Israel wants to withdraw from the Palestinian Arab dominated areas – the OPTs, the Galilee, and the Negev – and exercise their “self-governance” by actually governing themselves (maybe with small minorities), fine. But we know this isn’t going to happen. “Self-governance” being imposed on a population of equal size that is not and can never be part of the “self” to be governed because their mothers belong to wrong ethnicity. This IS NOT “self-governance” but ethnocentric – racist – domination.

    Quit repeating the same empty mantra about “self-governance” and address the issue at hand, the imposition of “Jewish self-governance” on millions upon millions of non-Jews. If there is any validity to your point, please make the point already. There is no problem with Jewish “self-governance” if it is applied to Jews (or primarily to Jews), but that simply isn’t the case. I’ve made this case repeatedly and am STILL waiting for you to address it.

35. Tom Mitchell Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 8:11 pm

    Peter,
    1) The Afrikaners were dependent on the belt of settler colonies to the north of them that provided them with a security zone that was hundreds of miles wide. That zone began to collapse in 1975 when Portugal, after insurgencies that had lasted 10 and 14 years respectively, gave independence to Mozambique and Angola. Next came Rhodesia, which under majority rule became Zimbabwe in 1980. Finally, South Africa withdrew from Namibia in 1989-90 and was soon in the process of negotiating majority rule with the ANC.

    2) The partition in Ireland took place in 1921-22 when Britain separated two-thirds of the province of Ulster and made it into Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement is an attempt to deal fairly with the 45% of the population of Irish extraction in exchange for both Ireland and the Irish Republicans giving up their legal claims against Northern Ireland and the use of violence to achieve unification.

    3)De-facto partition has occurred in Bosnia. Bosniaks refused to grant independence to the Serbs and weren’t in a position to take back the territory that the Serbs had captured.

    4) The partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey might in fact be a good solution to the Cypriot conflict.

    You should go to the MeretzUSA website and look at today’s comment on what is taking place in Great Britain between England and Scotland.

    5) The religious community in the U.S. that is driving American support for Israel is largely the evangelical (particularly the fundamentalist) Protestant community not the Jews. Palestinians and Arabs can at best try to neutralize right-wing Jewish support for Israel in the Democratic Party; they have no influence in the Republican Party.

    6) The SDLP had considerable support within the Labor Party in Britain, the unionists didn’t have comparable support within the Tories after the mid-1980s. David Trimble, leader of the UUP, managed to neutralize support for the Irish minority within the Labor Party.

    7) While Israelis enjoy an artificially high lifestyle due to American economic aid they could easily survive without it. Israel has diversified enough trade that it could survive any serious attempt at economic sanctions. What hurt Pretoria were financial sanctions by European banks in response to widespread internal unrest in the mid-1980s rather than the limited trade sanctions from the EEC and U.S. that followed that unrest. If you don’t believe me read the book by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Seeking Mandela (2005). Moodley is an ex-pat South African and her husband/collaborator is a German-Canadian South African expert. I wrote my doctoral dissertation on internal settlements in Southern Africa so I know that trade sanctions only affected about 3% of South African trade. Rhodesia fought on for a decade after UN comprehensive trade sanctions were passed. The U.S. won’t allow similar sanctions against Israel and the Palestinian intifada doesn’t begin to compare with the guerrilla insurgency that the Smith government faced in Israel.

    Once western Palestine is repartitioned in a peace settlement into Israel and Palestine, Israeli Palestinians might be accommodated with some sort of cultural and possibly even territorial autonomy within Israel. Most Palestinians live in the Galilee and the Negev apart from Jews so this should be feasible.

36. Richard Witty Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 8:54 pm

    John,
    Your dismissal of points when made doesn’t make them “not made”.

    The closeness of the two-state solution is in two steps that have evolved over an extended period, and are close to firm.

    They do not depend on the Zionist left, as it is states themselves that would be implementing.

    1. The formation of the Palestinian unity government, that will have to deal with the issues of continuity and loyalty to that continuity, that it had not previously. As you indicated, Hamas is gradually moderated from its sobering period as government head.

    An authority to make and keep its word.

    2. The reiteration of the Saudi peace proposal.

    For Israel, the logic of peace at the green line that has the teeth of pan-Arab consent knocks out the objections to the green line as border. The green line as border is MORE defensible than the maze of the wall. It pushes the issues to the end game.

    In many ways the invocation of one-state proposal is itself an attempt to delay or distract from reconciliation.

    Blah, blah, blah is less than an argument. It is the real issue for Israelis, especially given the utter absence of basis of confidence that an agitation oriented position implies.

    I’m sorry that you are not sympathetic with the concept that Zionism is a self-determination movement.

    Most Israelis are. Most diaspora Jews are.

    And similarly, most Palestinians do not want to share governance with Israelis currently.

    There is real fear of very brutal civil war (an issue you neglected), and real fear that at the end of the nearly inevitable struggle the result will either resemble a deeper oppression by Israelis (who are adept at acquiring territory as aftermath of wars, as Uri Avnery referred), or a situation that is nearly exactly the same as current (but after a brutal civil war).

    And, you also didn’t address the point about where to focus political action.

    The militant perspective targets those on the fringes, the impressionable youthful prospective left. (The repitition of invocations of Vietnam, South Africa, are informative BUT, also indicate either a political skill-lessness in seeking to repeat a familiar model, or a nostalgia, rather than addressing what is new uniquely).

    In contrast, if you are in earnest about building civil connections, reconciliation of the political center of the communities themselves are far far more promising in realizing anything consented and just.

    And that comes about by 90% of expression being recognition of the other’s needs, concerns, perspective, rather than 90% being agitation to dismiss the other’s needs, concerns and perspective.

37. Dan Fleshler Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 9:55 pm

    John,

    You wrote:

    “Quit repeating the same empty mantra about “self-governance” and address the issue at hand, the imposition of “Jewish self-governance” on millions upon millions of non-Jews.”

    Forgive me if you have already addressed this in previous threads…but if Jews are 70-80% of the population of a Jewish state west of the Green Line, and the Palestinians have their own state east of the Green Line –and Israel’s Arab minority would have the right of return to a Palestinian state if they chose to exercise it, then how would that be an “imposition of Jewish self-governance” on millions of non-Jews?

    The only way that makes sense is if one accepts your premise that no viable Palestinian state is possible…That is something you have not proven because it cannot be proven, so your logic is circular.

    Your conviction that the 2-state solution is dead is a kind of despairing leap of faith, based on your belief that the Israelis would never be willing to make the sacrifices they need to make and the Palestinians in the OPTS will never get their act together. You may well be right. But you discount the possibility that a combination of international pressure and international carrots –a/la the Saudi plan– might help to push both Israelis and Palestinians in a different direction. If you somehow believe that international pressure could be so fiercesome and powerful that it would force Israeli Jews to accept the plight of living as a minority in a bi-national state, why couldn’t that same pressure result in something much less ambitious –like withdrawal from most of the OPTs?

38. John S. Says:
    May 7th, 2007 at 10:31 pm

    Hi Tom,

    ”1) The Afrikaners were dependent on the belt of settler colonies to the north of them that provided them with a security zone that was hundreds of miles wide. That zone began to collapse in 1975 when Portugal, after insurgencies that had lasted 10 and 14 years respectively, gave independence to Mozambique and Angola. Next came Rhodesia, which under majority rule became Zimbabwe in 1980. Finally, South Africa withdrew from Namibia in 1989-90 and was soon in the process of negotiating majority rule with the ANC.”

    I might contest that the Afrikaners were “dependent” on this reality at least insofar as their domestic policy was concerned, but as for the general observation, no objections from me. Keep in mind, the external resistance to the Apartheid state was marginal at best, a few sporadic raids, weapons smuggling, &c. Losing the “buffer belt” was certainly a complication, but not the loss of a sustaining element of the Apartheid regime as such. Perhaps you mean this observation is a context I’m missing?

    ”2) The partition in Ireland took place in 1921-22 when Britain separated two-thirds of the province of Ulster and made it into Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement is an attempt to deal fairly with the 45% of the population of Irish extraction in exchange for both Ireland and the Irish Republicans giving up their legal claims against Northern Ireland and the use of violence to achieve unification.”

    Agreed. Nevertheless, this doesn’t invalidate my observations about the role of British patronage if that was the intent.

    ”3)De-facto partition has occurred in Bosnia. Bosniaks refused to grant independence to the Serbs and weren’t in a position to take back the territory that the Serbs had captured.”

    Bijeljina (a/k/a Republic of Serbska). Though on better terms, the Croat portion is relatively separate as well. Point?

    ”The partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey might in fact be a good solution to the Cypriot conflict.”

    Only because both Cypriot entities have relatively evenly matched – and even ostensibly allied via NATO – patrons (Greece & Turkey) who have a vested interest in not allowing the war to escalate. Despite the small size of the Turkish Cypriot entity, due to their more powerful patrons, both entities on the island are essentially evenly matched. There is no radical disparity in power & position because of the patronage, thus this is a very different situation than most of the other examples cited. A sustainable stalemate because neither Greece nor Turkey has an interest in full scale war.

    ”You should go to the MeretzUSA website and look at today’s comment on what is taking place in Great Britain between England and Scotland.”

    I’ve followed the SNP & friends for a while, but again you’re dealing with a radically different situation because of the over riding role of the EU to make separation viable. Without this supra-national framework, an independent Scotland (like an independent Slovakia or Bosnia or Slovenia) is a non-starter.

    ”5) The religious community in the U.S. that is driving American support for Israel is largely the evangelical (particularly the fundamentalist) Protestant community not the Jews. Palestinians and Arabs can at best try to neutralize right-wing Jewish support for Israel in the Democratic Party; they have no influence in the Republican Party.”

    I completely agree on all counts and have said as much here.

    ”6) The SDLP had considerable support within the Labor Party in Britain, the unionists didn’t have comparable support within the Tories after the mid-1980s. David Trimble, leader of the UUP, managed to neutralize support for the Irish minority within the Labor Party.”

    Not sure of your intended point here. Clarify?

    The next point I’m going to break down to smaller parts to reply to.

    ”7) While Israelis enjoy an artificially high lifestyle due to American economic aid they could easily survive without it.”

    Not necessarily. Here we come to a situation rather unique to Israel (though South Africa had a similar trend beginning in the late 1970’s), specifically, most secular Israelis are marketable and really do not have to stay in Israel/Palestine at all. Already as far back as 1993 there were some 760,000 Israelis that had emigrated for better opportunities and living standards (see G. Alon in Ha’aretz, 19 Nov. 2003). It has to maintain a very high First-World standard of living in order to keep its young, very well educated population at home. Failing that, most of the First World is more than happy to allow educated Israelis with marketable skills to settle in their respective countries. So, yes, theoretically Israel could survive without US support, but that supposition is predicated on the premise the most Israelis – esp. the young educated ones – would be WILLING to do so. The existing track record argues otherwise. Quite simply, most educated Israelis don’t have to “tighten their belts and tough it out,” they can simply pick up and move, as plenty already have.
    ”Israel has diversified enough trade that it could survive any serious attempt at economic sanctions.”

    Possibly true, but again that depends on whether or not most Israelis would be willing to deal with a major reduction in their living standards. Already, just a couple weeks ago, there was news report saying that emigration has now overtaken immigration for Israelis Jews and we haven’t even reached the “crunch” time yet. Your prediction depends on the assumption that Israel’s vital human capital – its marketable talent – would be willing to stay, a premise that isn’t supported by the available data.

    ”What hurt Pretoria were financial sanctions by European banks in response to widespread internal unrest in the mid-1980s rather than the limited trade sanctions from the EEC and U.S. that followed that unrest. If you don’t believe me read the book by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Seeking Mandela (2005). Moodley is an ex-pat South African and her husband/collaborator is a German-Canadian South African expert. I wrote my doctoral dissertation on internal settlements in Southern Africa so I know that trade sanctions only affected about 3% of South African trade. Rhodesia fought on for a decade after UN comprehensive trade sanctions were passed.”

    You are absolutely correct and as mentioned before, this is one point where I disagree with Ilan Pappe’s projected course of action. In fact, international sanctions as such have rarely been successful in forcing social or political change. This isn’t really necessary at all. People like George Shepherd Jr. have a bad habit of over emphasizing the international role in the South African struggle, whereas other authors like those included in Cobbett & Cohen’s “Popular Struggles in South Africa” were much more direct in giving credit where it was due – domestically.

    However, one of the principle differences here is that South Africa was effectively independent, even before the rise of the National Party in 1948. True, the official Republic didn’t come into existence until later, but pretty much from Balfour’s declaration regarding the dominions, South Africa was not dependent on external patronage to maintain itself. Such is not the case with Israel, which is a dependent of the US.
    Thus, instead of advocating a global campaign against Israel – as Pappe does – I instead believe that it should be a methodical campaign to end US patronage. In the absence of US protection and economic aid, Israel will have no choice but to deal in good faith for a workable solution. In fact I believe this is an easier fight than that faced during the Anti-Apartheid campaign because here we are not dealing with an effort to stop hundreds of corporations and dozens of countries from ending relations with the state, but instead we are focused on convincing one country to do so – the US. The Diplomatic protection is of more import than the economic support by far. Further, though many of my fellow Jewish-Americans have a hard time understanding or believing it, Israel is not a major priority for most Americans in general so here we can follow the domestic US example of the mobilization against Apartheid. Most of the rest of the world is already on board to one extent or another.

    ”The U.S. won’t allow similar sanctions against Israel and the Palestinian intifada doesn’t begin to compare with the guerrilla insurgency that the Smith government faced in Israel.

    I think you mean in Rhodesia, but yes, I get your point. Anyway, the point is to break the US patronage. As noted previously this patronage is already only sentimental – Israel and our support for it provides no tangible benefits today and is in fact a liability for the US – so we are not talking about the impossible here. The key is the United States and its patronage.

    ”Once western Palestine is repartitioned in a peace settlement into Israel and Palestine, Israeli Palestinians might be accommodated with some sort of cultural and possibly even territorial autonomy within Israel. Most Palestinians live in the Galilee and the Negev apart from Jews so this should be feasible.”

    Again – and this is a theme I’ve touched on repeatedly – this assumes that Israel would be willing to allow a real partition and surrender some real control, a notion for which there is absolutely no objective reason to believe is even on the agenda. I do believe that in time Israel will reach this conclusion, but I also suspect that this will take a decade or so; and in the meantime the Palestinian position – and demands – will be changing as well. By the time Israel is willing to consider real partition, I very seriously doubt that this will be an acceptable option from the Palestinian side. Time is on their side, all the Palestinians have to do is stay alive and stay in place; the decisions